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Introduction 
This report, prepared for the Foresight project Migration and Global Environmental Change, 
aims to study an important factor that has the potential to affect environmentally induced 
migration (EIM) in the Mediterranean: the externalisation of migration control policies adopted 
at the European Union (EU) level. The main aim of the report is to explore the externalisation–
EIM nexus in the southern Mediterranean region (specifically in North Africa). To this aim, 
possible areas of interaction between two processes will be discussed by providing insight 
about the tools of externalisation. Based on this discussion about EIM in the Mediterranean, 
four future scenarios will be outlined. 
The analysis will start with the discussion of externalisation and environmental migration 
interaction in southern Mediterranean. Three tasks will be performed in the first section: (i) the 
externalisation of migration policy will be examined through the historical development of the 
process vis-à-vis the EU’s southern neighbourhood; (ii) the EU’s approach to EIM will be 
explained; and (iii) the section will conclude with the discussion of interaction areas between 
the two processes. The second section studies the policy tools of externalisation, and the third 
section discusses the effects of externalisation processes for migrants who are caught in the 
buffer zone and for societies/states in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The empirical focus is 
on the externalisation practices taking place since 2004 to the end of 2010. These discussions 
will contribute to the construction of future scenarios regarding EIM in the Mediterranean region 
in the last section. Before this engagement, two caveats are in order. 
First, in EU decision making, the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the 
European Parliament interact. When a decision in the area of externalisation of migration 
control is to be taken, important disagreements often emerge between these institutions. For 
example, the European Parliament is critical to the externalisation tools adopted (Rodier, 
2006). Institutional politics around externalisation and discursive competition of different EU 
institutions and member states have been studied and must be acknowledged (Jeandesboz, 
2009; Pawlak, 2009). Moreover, some tools discussed below have been operationalised more 
effectively and intensively by member states than by the EU as a result of their bilateral 
arrangements with southern Mediterranean states. 
Another caveat concerns the link between migration and environmental change. It is generally 
accepted that a direct causal relationship between environmental change and migration has 
not been determined yet (De Haas, 2007). According to the prevailing view in the academic 
literature, migration is affected by a combination of push and pull factors in political, economic 
and social areas, but not in environmental areas per se. Acknowledging the accuracy of this, 
possible interaction between the EU’s externalisation policies and EIM is still a legitimate 
question because externalisation and this type of migration can affect each other.  
Externalisation/environmental migration 
nexus in the southern Mediterranean 
Emergence and development of the idea of externalisation 
The harmonisation of migration and asylum policies of EU member states since the late 1980s 
failed to control migration flows in EU member states where the issue of migration was being 
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politicised along the lines of ‘abuse to the asylum system’ and ‘illegal immigrant influx’ (Van 
Dijk, 1997; Brochmann and Hammer, 1999). Within this politicised environment, policy makers 
at EU level developed a migration policy that aims to integrate EU neighbours into the attempt 
to halt unwanted migrants (i.e. irregular migrants and assumedly ‘bogus’ asylum seekers). The 
connection between migration policies and external relations stemmed from the idea that the 
effective way of ensuring freedoms in the EU is conditional upon securing EU borders through 
cooperation with neighbouring states. This idea resulted in the launch of the externalisation 
process. 
The externalisation of migration control, which is one of the central dimensions of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), was in fact shaped long before the launch of ENP in 2004. In the 
Edinburgh European Council of 1992, external aspects of migration control were discussed for 
the first time at EU level. The idea of readmission agreements was introduced in Edinburgh 
(Balzacq, 2009: 23). In the same year, the pillar structure was created with the Maastricht 
Treaty. While the external relations of the Union were included in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Pillar (the second pillar), migration was dealt with under the Justice and Home 
Affairs Pillar (the third pillar). 
In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, or the Barcelona Process) was launched 
vis-à-vis the EU’s southern neighbourhood. However, migration control was not one of the top 
political objectives of the EMP, which focused mainly on political and economic cooperation 
between the partners. This situation changed in parallel with two intra-EU developments. First, 
in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty created the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), 
where EU citizens would enjoy freedoms extensively in a secure environment within EU 
borders. Controlling borders was deemed necessary for this (Guild, 2006). Second, in 1998, 
the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration was established to discuss the 
external dimension of migration in the EU and to formulate policies targeting any country that 
migrants pass on the way to the EU. For the first time, action plans were designed for some 
transit and migrant-producing countries (Balzacq, 2009: 23).  
In the Tampere Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 1999), it was stated that ‘all 
competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in external 
relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in the definition and 
implementation of other Union policies and activities’. As a result, a ‘cross-pillarisation’ process 
between the second and third pillars was given an impetus (Pawlak, 2009). The 9/11 terrorist 
attacks affected this process by enforcing cooperation in the area of counterterrorism in the 
political agenda of EU external affairs. In the Laeken Presidency Conclusions (European 
Council, 2001), ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘terrorism’ were discussed together as threats to 
European security. In 2002, the link between external relations and migration control was 
strengthened. In the Seville Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 2002), it was stated 
that ‘any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union or 
the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint 
management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal 
immigration’. After the Madrid bombings in 2004, the Hague Action Plan (EU Council, 2004a) 
was adopted with a strong focus on security, which, according to the EU member states, had 
‘acquired new urgency’ (Balzacq and Carrera, 2006)1. 
                                            
1 Balzacq and Carrera argued that the Hague action plan had a stronger focus on security, and then analysed the 
process of securitisation through policy tools. For the opposite view, see Boswell (2007). 
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The ENP was launched in 2004 in this political environment with a special emphasis on 
externalisation of migration control policies. The ENP was designed to target the EU’s eastern 
and southern neighbourhoods (the Middle East and North Africa), excluding Turkey2. 
Association agreements were signed with the participating neighbours. The Commission was 
tasked to prepare action plans for all partners. All action plans included clauses about 
migration control. Since 2005, the Commission has been preparing annual progress reports for 
each partner country3. In 2005, following the call from the European Council (the heads of 
Member States), the Commission and the Council prepared Global Approach to Migration: 
Priority Actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. In this document, the following 
practices were determined as some priority areas: 
• ‘implementing joint operations in the Mediterranean Sea; 
• establishing regional network of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) in the 
Mediterranean; 
• making available experiences and best practices where appropriate from other regional 
cooperation structures; 
• engaging third Mediterranean countries in the feasibility study of a Mediterranean 
Coastal Patrols Network, Mediterranean surveillance system.’ (EU Council, 2005). 
The externalisation of migration control has been generally performed through the tools above. 
The externalisation of migration control has two components: (i) the exportation of classic 
migration control instruments (such as border control or capacity building for asylum 
applications) to sending or transit countries outside the EU; (ii) a series of provisions for 
facilitating the return of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to third countries (Boswell, 2003: 
620–622). The underlying rationality of externalisation can be defined as ‘external governance 
of the EU’s internal security’, which refers to ‘the mode of governance through which the EU 
seeks to ensure the European Neighbourhood Policy’s countries’ participation in the realization 
of its internal security project’ (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009). In other words, as put by Wolff 
et al. (2009: 13), an idea was institutionalized: ‘the EU’s external relations should be used to 
attain the EU’s internal security objectives’. The primary internal security project of the EU is to 
construct an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. 
                                            
2 In 2008, Union for Mediterranean (UfM) was launched as a new scheme to reinvigorate the principles of the 
Barcelona Process. However, migration control is not on the political agenda of the Union. Although it focuses on 
cooperation across the Mediterranean countries on environmental issues, this cooperation does not entail EIM. 
That is why UfM was not included in the analysis. See http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/environment-
and-water/ 
3 Action plans were prepared by the EU in consultation with the partner states in the ENP. The plans shape the 
areas and level of bilateral cooperation between the partner state and the EU. For the plans and reports, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm  
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Environmentally induced migration in the Mediterranean and the 
EU 
In June 2007, the European Council invited the High Representative and the EU Commission 
to prepare a report on climate change and international security. The report was published in 
March 2008. In this joint report, the High Representative and the EU Commission (2008a) 
presented a perspective that understands climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’. It means that 
climate change ‘exacerbates existing trends, tensions, and instability. The core challenge is 
that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and 
conflict prone’. The report defined EIM under the title of ‘threats’. In parallel with the threat 
multiplier understanding, the report argued that ‘those parts of the populations that already 
suffer from poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are rendered more 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change … Europe must expect substantially increased 
migratory pressure’. As made clear in the follow-up report presented by the High 
Representative (EU Commission, 2008b), EIM is the ‘main area of concern’ of the EU only in 
relation to the Maghreb (not, for example, Africa or Central Asia). The Council (2009) endorsed 
both reports. 
Interaction between EIM and externalisation can be shaped by the nature of the former (Brown 
and Crawford, 2009: 17–18). First, migration can be triggered by a ‘climate event’, which refers 
to a sudden and hazardous change in environmental conditions that makes a geographical 
area uninhabitable (e.g. hurricanes, floods, typhoons). EIM due to climate events in the 
southern Mediterranean can be thought in relation to floods. Although they are not common in 
southern Mediterranean countries, when floods take place their effects are disastrous (such as 
the flood disaster in November 2001 in Algeria). As the population is densely concentrated in 
areas where the risk of flood is high, population movement in the case of flood is likely (De 
Haas, 2011). However, it must be noted that climate events in the southern Mediterranean 
(such as monsoons in India and Bangladesh or the 2004 tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia) 
are unlikely. The greater risk for the southern Mediterranean is environmental change that 
takes place in time and, in combination with political, economic and social factors, prompts 
individuals to migrate: climate processes. 
Second, EIM can occur as a result of ‘climate processes’, which are slow changes in time in 
environmental conditions (e.g. sea-level rise, salinisation and desertification). Populations can 
be affected by climate processes if the existing political, economic and social structures fail to 
protect the groups from the disastrous effects of these processes. In other words, climate 
change does not directly trigger migration, but takes the form of a ‘threat multiplier’, as defined 
by the European Commission. A closer look at some indicators of environmental change in the 
southern Mediterranean points at the seriousness of the situation. 
In North African countries, as a result of erosion, salinisation and urbanisation, land 
degradation can be observed not only in dry areas but also in irrigated areas (Thivet, 2007). In 
relation to land degradation, desertification has also been observed in Morocco, coastal Algeria 
and Tunisia (Plan Bleu, 2008). In the same countries, aridity is expected as a result of a 
decrease in precipitation and an increase in temperature (MedSec, 2009). Population 
movements inside the countries have already been occurring from rural to urban areas, for 
example in Egypt and Tunisia. If this type of population movement continues inside the 
countries, the pressure over already scarce water resources will increase. As a result, this will 
cause a decline in crop productivity by rendering these countries dependent on food imports 
(World Bank, 2009). These environmental factors should also be thought in relation to the 
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demographic growth. The population increase in southern Mediterranean countries is likely to 
occur in coastal areas (UN, 2009). 
So far, two processes have been discussed: the externalisation of migration control policy 
adopted at the EU level and EIM in the southern Mediterranean. While the latter has a potential 
to increase immigrant flow towards the EU, the former endeavours to keep some, if not all, 
migrants outside the AFSJ. The following subsection will focus on how the interaction between 
these two processes can take place. 
Externalisation/environmentally induced migration: possible 
interaction areas 
In the southern Mediterranean, externalisation and EIM interact in three areas. First, because 
of the geographical proximity and the migration network provided by North Africans in the EU, 
EIM can accelerate migratory pressures towards the EU by challenging the externalisation 
process. Second, considering that the southern Mediterranean is the main concern of the EU in 
relation to EIM (see section IV), it can be argued that the EU’s approach to environmental 
migration (or how the EU tackles environmentally induced migrants) will be influenced by the 
externalisation process as well. With the extensive focus on offloading migrants to the buffer 
zone, environmentally induced migrants can also be offloaded. Whether or not this happens, 
however, is not currently clear as EIM has not been specifically addressed by the EU. EU 
institutions prefer to address climate change-related issues (such as desertification through the 
Nile Basin Initiative) that might cause migration. However, the question remains as to how the 
Commission or the Council deals with EIM from and via the southern Mediterranean per se. 
ENP action plans include clauses about environment and migration separately without so far 
forming a linkage between the two issues. For example, Egypt’s action plan includes clauses 
such as ‘implementation the national plan for combating desertification’4. With this, the EU and 
Egypt acknowledged the problem of desertification in Egypt. However, they omitted to 
formulate possible actions to address human mobility from the southern Mediterranean to the 
northern shores caused by desertification. 
The final area of interaction concerns the fact that although EU-level institutions refrain from 
using the language of ‘forced migration’ or ‘refugee’ in relation to EIM, mass influx of 
environmentally induced migrants from the southern Mediterranean can challenge the 
offloading asylum responsibilities to southern neighbourhood. The International Association for 
the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) recognises environmentally induced migrants as forced 
migrants5. Contrary to these approaches, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
uses ‘environmental migrants’ who are ‘persons or group of persons, who, for compelling 
reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives 
or living conditions’ (Brown, 2008). This definition does not use ‘forced migration’ language, 
although it acknowledges the compulsory nature of EIM. However, no governmental actor has 
so far given a sign of recognising the compulsory nature of this type of migration, as this 
recognition might imply the responsibility of offering protection to these migrants. Having an 
important intergovernmental character, the EU is not an exception. 
                                            
4 EU/Egypt Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 
5 Forced Migration website, http://www.forcedmigration.org/whatisfm.htm 
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In the southern Mediterranean, a mass influx of migrants following a ‘climate event’ can take 
the form of forced migration, which challenges the externalisation process of asylum policies. In 
the face of such immigrant influx, the EU might accept them as forced migrants and offer 
‘subsidiary protection status’ (SPS), which is a form of ‘international protection status, separate 
but complementary to refugee status, granted by a member state to a third country national or 
stateless person who is not a refugee but is otherwise in need of international protection and is 
admitted as such to the territory of this Member State’ (EU Commission, 2001). However, there 
is no acquis in the EU about this status. In addition, the adoption of SPS at the EU level may 
have a marginal impact on EIM. This is because as asylum policies are externalised through 
Safe Third Country policy and Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), environmentally 
induced migrants can still be offloaded to the buffer zone. 
The process of externalisation should be re-thought in relation to EIM from and via the 
southern Mediterranean as two processes are likely to challenge each other. The next two 
sections will discuss the policy tools of externalisation and their effects on migrants and 
states/societies in North Africa. 
The objective and policy tools of 
externalisation in the southern 
Mediterranean 
The tool (or instrument approach) is primarily introduced in the area of EU’s external relations 
by Thierry Balzacq (2009). For Balzacq, a tool or an instrument embodies ‘a specific image of 
the partners and, to a large extent, what ought to be done’ (2009: 17). He then defines three 
types of tools. Regulatory tools (such as action plans) aim to structure the milieu where the 
other two tools can be implemented. Incentive tools provide a ‘carrot’ to the partners to 
cooperate with the EU and capacity tools aim to improve the skills of the partners to pursue a 
policy successfully (2009: 18–20). The following will focus mainly on the capacity tools of 
externalisation of migration policy. These are the tools that both the EU and member states 
have been largely adopting. Through these policies, a buffer zone has been constructed in the 
southern Mediterranean.  
The externalisation of migration control policies has one main goal: keeping the unwanted 
migrants (that said, assumedly ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and irregular migrants) outside EU 
borders by constructing a buffer zone between the AFSJ and these migrants. This buffer zone 
corresponds to the third circle in the four-level concentric circle model developed by Lavenex 
and Uçarer (2002). According to their model, the first ‘inner circle’ is the Western European 
countries; the second circle is the accession countries in Eastern Europe; the fourth is the 
countries that produce migrants, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The 
third circle, which is defined in this report as the ‘buffer zone’, includes countries that are tied to 
the EU through association agreements. The main objective of the third circle is to act like a 
buffer zone to stop some migrants before they migrate further to the second and first circles 
(Lavenex and Uçarer, 2002: 8–9). 
This buffer zone is designed to perform three functions. The first function is to process asylum 
applications of would-be refugees outside EU borders by ‘assuming’ that partner states in the 
neighbourhood offer sufficient protection for those who seek international protection. This 
policy helps offload EU member states’ asylum responsibility to the neighbourhood and 
determine genuine refugees outside the EU borders. Second, the Council, along with the 
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Commission, aims to prevent the movement of irregular migrants towards the EU through 
policies that are performed in cooperation with the EU’s neighbours. Irregular migrants are 
stopped either before they start their migration (e.g. keeping them in migrant camps in the 
southern Mediterranean) or during their migration (border guard operations in the territorial 
waters of southern Mediterranean states). The third function of the buffer zone is that the EU 
neighbourhood becomes, so to speak, a ‘dumping area’ of the EU to which member states 
extradite irregular migrants inside the EU. The primary policy in relation to this objective is the 
readmission agreements. 
As to the capacity tools, it is possible to highlight particular tools derived from the action plans 
of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. These instruments include exporting surveillance technology to 
partner countries, training their border guards, providing financial aid to modernise security 
enforcement agencies in order to increase their ability to deal with irregular migration, sending 
Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) and engaging with information exchange. According to the 
EU Council (2004b), sending ILOs to neighbouring states contributes to increasing information 
exchange in the areas of irregular migration control, repatriating apprehended irregular 
migrants and managing regular migration. Libya and Morocco particularly are frontrunners in 
this cooperation (HRW, 2006a). The ENP action plan of Morocco determined the construction 
of the largest border surveillance system in the southern neighbourhood in this country. As a 
policy of capacity building of the Algerian police, the EU has allocated €10 million (Cabras, 
2009). Egypt obtained financial help in order to enhance information exchange on the issue of 
migration; Egypt and the EU have also worked together in the Working Group on Migration, 
Social and Consular Affairs (EU Commission, 2009). 
As one of the central functions of the buffer zone in the southern Mediterranean is to create a 
legal space to which the EU can repatriate irregular migrants, re-admission agreements have 
been considered as vital to constructing this space. All action plans include a clause about 
negotiating re-admission agreements under the framework of ENP. The EU also provides a 
carrot to encourage the ENP partners to sign a multilateral re-admission agreement: visa 
facilitation for the nationals of states which signed the agreement. In this sense, this tool has 
the character of incentive tool, albeit an unsuccessful one. No southern Mediterranean states 
have so far signed such an agreement for visa facilitation, although it has been an objective 
since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995. This is mainly because southern 
Mediterranean states do not wish to become areas where EU member states send unwanted 
migrants out through these agreements (De Haas, 2006). 
In the area of asylum, the main capacity tool is to launch RPPs (EU Commission, 2005). In 
fact, the externalisation of asylum policy started with the introduction of ‘Host Third Country’ 
and ‘Safe Third Country’ principles, which enabled EU member states to send asylum seekers 
back to those countries that they passed on their way to the EU. This process started in the 
early 1990s in relation to the eastern neighbourhood as a matter of ‘redistribution for handling 
asylum claims’ (Lavenex, 1999: 76, see especially 76–83). These countries were deemed to be 
safe by the EU. The introduction of RPPs is another phase of the externalisation process that 
enables EU member states to process asylum applications in the neighbourhood where RPPs 
are launched. RPPs were officially created in 2005. As stated by Justice and Home Affairs 
Commissioner Antonio Vitorino (2005), the EU’s objective with RPPs is to ‘transform a country 
of transit [in the EU’s neighbourhood] into a country of first asylum’. To this aim, Euromed 
Migration II in 2008 was initiated. The Commission (2010) proposed to launch RPPs in Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia. 
The construction of a buffer zone through the process of externalisation mainly involves 
capacity tools. However, there is also another tool, which cannot be included in one of the 
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three tools of Balzacq. The EU (and EU member states) also externalises migration control 
policies into the southern neighbourhood through militarising the Mediterranean Sea. In 2003, 
the Spain–Morocco and the Italy–Libya agreements were announced with regard to joint naval 
patrols in the Mediterranean Sea (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). Since 2004, Morocco–Spanish 
joint naval patrols have conducted off-shore operations in both the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Atlantic Ocean (Lahlau, 2006: 121). In 2003, five southern European countries (Portugal, 
Spain, France, Italy and Greece) agreed to create a European security zone to tackle irregular 
migration by military means on their territorial water together (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 21). 
In 2004, the EU’s border agency FRONTEX was established. FRONTEX-coordinated 
operations have been continuing in the Mediterranean since then (Donoghue et al., 2006; 
FRONTEX, 2010). 
Effects of externalisation in the southern 
neighbourhood of the EU 
Effects of externalisation on migrants in southern Mediterranean 
One of the most important implications of externalisation policies (especially in the form of 
militarisation of the Mediterranean Sea) is that irregular migrants are not deterred from 
migration as a result of these policies, but they are encouraged to explore new routes, some of 
which are more dangerous and risky (Spijkerboer, 2007: 131). For example, in 2002, Spain 
introduced SIVE (Spanish Integral Service of External Vigilance) to its borders. SIVE included 
thermal and infrared cameras, police units and surveillance towers. The objectives were to 
detect smuggling boats on the sea through 24-hour surveillance of coastal areas and constant 
patrolling. In 2004, the apprehended irregular migrants on the Spanish mainland border were 
15,675; in 2005 the number decreased to 11,781; in the same period, the number on Italian 
borders rose from 13,594 in 2004 to 22,824 in 2005 (Cuttitta, 2007: 2). However, the most 
considerable effect was the sharp increase in the Canary Islands. In 2005, the number of 
detected irregular migrants was 4,715; the number in 2006 was nearly 31,000 (De Haas, 2007: 
62). The point is that the militarisation of borders did not stop irregular migrants. The effect was 
the redirection of routes towards the less militarised, and sometimes more dangerous, areas. 
A similar trend can be observed by analysing recent data published by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The EU conducted six operations in the Mediterranean 
in 2009 (FRONTEX, 2010). The early statistics on 2009 from the UNHCR highlighted a certain 
level of decrease in the number of the irregular sea arrivals in southern European countries6. 
However, in the same period, the UNHCR observed a considerable increase in the level of 
irregular crossings from Somalia to Yemen, which is continuously reported as more risky and 
dangerous (see, for example, MSF, 2008). 
Another consequence of externalisation is that irregular migrants are encouraged to work with 
smuggling organisations that have become ‘professionalised’. Many smugglers have now 
upgraded their pataras (African-style wooden boats) to zodiacs equipped with surveillance 
systems (Lutterbeck, 2006: 77). These more ‘professionalised’ tools are introduced by 
smugglers so as not to be apprehended during the operations, which are partly conducted by 
                                            
6 UNHCR, Asylum and Migration (February 2010) http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html  
CS8 11
FRONTEX and partly by member states themselves in cooperation with North African partners. 
Notwithstanding the number of migrants saved, many deadly incidents also occur during the 
operations. There are reports that some boats capsized trying to escape from border guards; 
some crashed with border guards’ boats, leaving many irregular migrants dead. For example, 
on 28 July 2006, a smuggling boat was intercepted by border guards. During the ‘rescue’ 
operation, the boat capsized and two migrants died (Maccanico, 2006). Irregular migrants are 
also subjected to violence inflicted by human smugglers. Rapes, beatings, killings and verbal 
and physical insults by human smugglers are well documented by different non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and scholars (Van Hear, 2004; Collyer, 2006; Hamood, 2006; Carling, 
2007; Fortress Europe, 2007). 
Migrants have been subject to serious insecurities in the buffer zone that the EU has been 
constructing to keep out unwanted migrants. A migrant from Ethiopia who received refugee 
status in Italy explained the situation in Libya to Human Rights Watch: ‘Young Libyans in the 
street sit around and wait to attack foreigners … One day five Libyan men asked me my 
religion. I responded that I am Christian. They asked me my name and then grabbed me and 
beat me on the back … You cannot move freely on the streets, cannot attend school, cannot 
buy things in shops’ (HRW, 2006b). Christian immigrants in particular suffer from racist 
violence in southern Mediterranean countries (Fortress Europe, 2007). 
The abuse by the hands of some officials in Morocco was also observed. Médecins Sans 
Frontières (2006) published a report related to the violence migrants were subjected to by 
Moroccan officials. Similar incidents can be enlisted with examples from Libya, Morocco and 
Egypt. Among them, serious violations of human rights have been performed in migrant camps 
that are part of the process of externalisation under capacity building. A sub-Saharan migrant, 
Fatawhit, was detained in Kufrah detention centre and told Fortress Europe that ‘I have seen 
many women raped in Kufrah detention centre. The police officers would enter the room, take a 
woman and gang rape her in front of everyone. They did not distinguish between single and 
married woman; many of them ended up pregnant and had to undergo an abortion, illegally, 
endangering their lives seriously. I saw many women crying because their husbands were 
beaten, but it was of no use to stop the truncheon blows on their backs’ (Fortress Europe, 
2007). This is the Kufrah migration camp,which was visited by FRONTEX in 2007 in order to 
check the feasibility of the camp to use it as a detention centre. FRONTEX (2007) only found 
that the conditions in Kufrah were ‘rudimentary and lacking in basic amenities’. 
Effects of externalisation on southern Mediterranean countries 
Converting the southern Mediterranean region into a buffer zone through externalisation has 
had implications for the countries in the region as well (Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011). One of the 
most important consequences of externalisation (and therefore offloading migrants to the buffer 
zone) is, in parallel with the increasing number of migrants, the emergence of, as put by 
Bensaad (2007: 63), ‘slavery economies’. Coupled with xenophobia, negative perceptions 
about migrants spread among the societies in southern Mediterranean in relation to this new 
type of slavery economy. For example, in Libya, ‘a slavery economy is being built, with a mix of 
local notables and entrepreneurs, local and south Saharan mafias, and agents of the state: a 
slave market of labourers for construction and for domestic work, white slavery (although in this 
case, it is “blacks”) for prostitution, network of “racketeers” and “mules” for transit’ (Bensaad, 
2007: 63–64). Prostitution of sub-Saharan woman and children is spreading in Morocco, and 
the US Secretary of State Bureau of Demoracy and Human Rights criticised the Moroccan 
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government for its failure to address this problem7. Consequently, the slavery economy feeds 
into xenophobia and stereotypes in societies, an example of which was presented above. 
In addition, negative perceptions and attitudes towards migrants can be observed at state level 
(Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011). The Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs once stated that ‘certain 
quarters of Tripoli [being] … under the control of immigrants. They impose their laws; drugs 
and prostitution flourish. When I said that for us it’s an invasion, that is exactly what I think’ 
(quoted in Bensaad, 2007: 59–60). This type of attitude towards sub-Saharan migrants is 
widely documented (Holm, 2008; HRW, 2006a,b). As negative perceptions nestle into different 
levels of bureaucracies, attitudes of officials towards migrants become harsher (for example, 
situations in camps). It was reported that Egyptian security forces the use lethal weapons 
against irregular migrants who try to cross the border8. As more immigrants are accumulated in 
the buffer zone through externalisation policies of the EU, these types of xenophobic attitudes 
and violent practices to stop migration are likely to continue. 
The EU’s approach to EIM with specific focus on the southern Mediterranean emerged in 
tandem with the externalisation of migration control policies. The previous sections provide the 
foundation upon which the relationship between externalisation and environmental migration 
can be discussed in consideration with the possibilities that the EU (and member states) can 
face in the upcoming decades. The report will be concluded with a discussion of possible future 
scenarios that can arise in the southern Mediterranean. 
Environmental migration in the southern 
Mediterranean: future scenarios 
Based on the discussion above, four possible future scenarios can be constructed. For all 
scenarios, environmental degradation in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa continues. Two 
factors interact: externalisation (x-axis) and management of EIM by southern Mediterranean 
states (y-axis). 
Good management of EIM 
 
                                  A                                                            B 
   More externalisation                                                                  Less externalisation 
 
                                  C                                                            D 
 
 
Poor management of EIM 
                                            
7 See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136075.htm  
8 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm  
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In scenario A (good management of EIM by southern Mediterranean States and more 
externalisation by the EU), externalisation continues and becomes more intensive. The number 
of migrants in southern Mediterranean countries continues to increase. However, EIM is well 
managed by southern Mediterranean states by considering various factors such as 
urbanisation, equal distribution of scarce resources and human rights of migrants. 
In this scenario, although it is too early to conduct an analysis of recent uprisings in some 
southern Mediterranean countries in relation to EIM, newly formed popular governments 
perform a better management of natural resources and address the problems of desalinisation 
and desertification more efficiently than their predecessors. This can decrease the level of EIM 
within these countries. However, EIM from sub-Saharan Africa continues. States adopt policies 
to avoid leaving these migrants at the margins of the societies and to provide them with basic 
social and economic rights. Xenophobia decreases. As these migrants achieve some level of 
protection in these countries, they do not move towards the EU. 
The EU and member states provide development aid to address EIM specifically. Some 
development aid in the areas of migration and the environment has already channelled, albeit 
separately (Adepoju et al., 2009; Van Seters and Wolff, 2010). These instruments are strongly 
linked; specific projects to address EIM are created. The EU adds sections about EIM to the 
country environmental profiles of southern Mediterranean states. In other words, the EU links 
environmental change and migration in its external relations. Capacity tools of externalisation 
currently focus on the increasing capacity of southern Mediterranean states to keep unwanted 
migrants in their territories. These tools are adapted to serve better management of migration 
respecting funadamental rights and freedoms of migrants. 
In Scenario B (good management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states and less 
externalisation by the EU), EU member states are willing to accept some irregular migrants 
and/or asylum seekers, and integrate them into the host societies. Because EIM is well 
managed by southern Mediterranean states, the burden on the EU is not high. 
In this scenario, the following situation changes. As to the remainder, one of the most important 
objectives of externalisation is ‘to identify, isolate, and deflect the mala fide from the bona fide 
migrant’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 9). Mala fide migrants are primarily those who use 
irregular channels. The caveat here is that irregular migrants also include asylum seekers and 
those who need other types of protection9. However, the process of externalisation aims to 
offload all types of unwanted migrants without giving due attention to why they left their 
countries. EIM from sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East to Europe is likely to 
occur due to climatic processes, such as gradual decline of arable lands, salinisation and 
desertification (Pla Sentis, 2006). Environmental change hereby becomes a ‘threat multiplier’, 
which interacts and accelerates already existing political, economic and social problems. As a 
result, it will become a challenge to determine the causes of migration, whether or not the 
migrants will be considered as forced migrants. 
                                            
9 This point was made by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the Spanish Commission 
for Refugees (CEAR) and Amnesty International. Following the statement of FRONTEX about its operations 
in the Mediterranean, they urged the European governments that ‘European governments brag about their 
success in fighting irregular migration but refugees who are prevented from arriving to the European territory 
are paying the price of this “success”’. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Spanish Commission 
on Refugees and Amnesty International (2010), Human rights organizations urge the European 
governments to adapt border management to ensure that refugees can reach Europe’, 24 February. 
Available from: http://www.ecre.org/resources/Press_releases/1523  
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The EU currently lacks institutionalised mechanisms to address this problem, which has three 
dimensions: (i) the EU has not defined (or attempted to define) who environmentally induced 
migrants are (considering the interaction between different causes of migration, this represents 
an important challenge for the EU); (ii) the EU does not have a mechanism to tackle the mass 
influx of the EIMs as a result of a climate event; and (iii) the EU has not clarified if it addresses 
environmentally induced migrants as ‘forced migrants’ who need protection, and, if so, whether 
they will be addressed through RPPs in the buffer zone. For example, Denmark has a 
conception of ‘climate refugee’, but many EU states do not have such a specific refugee group. 
According to scenario B, EU institutions address these problems efficiently. Giving up the 
policy of keeping all unwanted migrants outside the EU borders, some protection mechanisms 
are created at the EU level to deal with environmentally forced migrants in the AFSJ. 
Denmark’s ‘climate refugee’ definition is Europeanised and member states provide them with 
some type of protection. SPS is also introduced as a solution to this problem. Three 
advantages can be listed. First, because the EU shares the burden with southern 
Mediterranean states, the possibility of social tensions on both sides of the Mediterranean 
decreases. Second, human rights of migrants can be better protected as their need for 
smuggling networks decreases. Third, because a new legal channel for environmentally 
induced migrants is created, irregular migration in the EU decreases. 
Scenario C (poor management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states and more 
externalisation by the EU): environmentally induced migrants will remain inside southern 
Mediterranean countries because individuals displaced by land degradation do not have 
resources to migrate to Northern Mediterranean countries through regular or irregular 
channels. In this scenario, migrants who have been offloaded by member states to southern 
Mediterranean countries have to compete with a greater number of natives for scarce 
resources. This creates internal tensions. While the number of migrants is increasing, slavery 
economies become stronger. Xenophobia increases. Tensions result in violent clashes (such 
as the crisis in Libya in 2000). 
Some environmentally induced migrants aim to migrate to Europe through irregular channels. 
As a result, they are subjected to externalisation tools. As they are not accepted as ‘forced 
migrants’, they are returned to their home countries, if they do not die during the Mediterranean 
crossings. This increases the level of human disasters faced by migrants as a result of 
externalisation policies. 
In the extreme version of this scenario, environmentally induced migrants migrate to Europe in 
great numbers through irregular channels. Although this possibility is more likely due to a 
climate event, the increasing number of migrants and the competition they create for limited 
resources can gradually cause a mass exodus. 
Interaction of climate processes with poverty, political instability, conflicts, social exclusion and 
economic marginalisation becomes a ‘push’ factor for migrants (Srichandan, 2009: 7). As a 
result, environmentally induced migrants increasingly become the targets of externalisation 
policies of the EU as many of them, lacking financial tools for legal migration, attempt to use 
irregular migration channels. Environmentally induced migrants are put in the all-encompassing 
basket of ‘illegal migrants’ and are offloaded in the buffer zone through militarised operations or 
readmission agreements, or RPPs if they seek asylum. New waves of EIMs contribute to 
already spreading negative ideas and attitudes towards migrants at societal and state level in 
the southern Mediterranean. 
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In scenario D (poor management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states and less 
externalisation by the EU), southern Mediterranean states fail to manage EIM. As the EU 
softens externalisation policy, more migrants will be willing to move to the EU. Motivated by 
environmental reasons and ineffective protection in southern Mediterranean states (push 
factors), environmentally induced migrants embark upon journeys to apply for protection in the 
EU (a pull factor). Moreover, non-EIMs also join them to abuse the new mechanism solely 
created for EIMs. This feeds anti-immigrant sentiments in the EU by feeding ‘bogus asylum 
seekers’ perceptions. As a result, new mechanisms in the EU such as ‘climate refugees’ are 
eventually abolished to prevent the abuse. 
In this scenario, new popular governments not only fail to establish the system of good 
governance to manage scarce resources, but also cannot provide stability in the region. This 
can create refugee movements, along with alleviating EIM. As the mass influx from Libya 
towards Europe has recently proved, the EU has no mechanism to deal with this type of 
migration other than restricting the Schengen Agreement for third-country nationals10. Human 
disasters in the Mediterranean crossings and the failure of EU units to prevent them, as 
happened in April–May 2011, continue (Shenker, 2011).  
Conclusion 
Can the EU address future EIM effectively in its southern neighbourhood in the next 50 years? 
This depends on the extent to which the EU bodies (including member states) prepare 
themselves institutionally for the possible problems stemming from accelerated migratory 
pressures from the southern Mediterranean towards the EU. In the southern Mediterranean, 
where the EU and member states direct their externalisation policies, possible migratory 
pressures towards Europe are projected. In sub-Saharan Africa, migration stemming from 
heavy urbanisation in coastal areas, drought and desertification in rural areas is likely to occur 
increasingly by 2050 (Brown and Crawford, 2009: 18–19). Although the majority of these sub-
Saharans generally migrate either within the country or to other neighbouring sub-Saharan 
countries, some might migrate in Europe via North Africa (Busby et al., 2010). As a result, they 
can be targeted by externalisation policies. The process of converting transit southern 
Mediterranean countries to countries of immigration will be accelerated. Migratory pressure 
from North Africa to Europe is also visible as decreasing arable lands in North Africa can 
generate migration. According to a projection based on the latest statistics, in 2050, 340,000 
additional agricultural-yield North Africans may migrate to Europe (the total number of 
agricultural-yield migrants from all of Africa to Europe is projected to be 1.92 million) (Busby et 
al., 2010: 9). 
The buffer zone that the EU has been constructing through externalisation policies in the 
southern Mediterranean has already given signs of discontent about increasing number of 
immigrants. At societal and state levels, xenophobia and violent attitudes towards immigrants 
have been documented. In different southern Mediterranean countries, neither state- nor 
societal-level actors are happy to be named as ‘the policeman of Europe’; they also find the 
EU’s externalisation policies to be ‘short-sighted’, not addressing the root causes of migration 
(Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011). These states are already reluctant to sign readmission agreements in 
spite of the EU’s offer of visa facilitation. Closing down the EU borders to environmentally 
                                            
10 See BBC News Website, France and Italy push for reform of Schengen treaty, 26 April 2011. Available from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13189682  
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induced migrants from sub-Saharan Africa can lead to more migrant accumulation in these 
countries. This in turn can hinder these states’ cooperation with the EU in the externalisation 
process. In addition, southern Mediterranean countries are also projected as producers of 
environmentally induced migrants. Competition over limited resources between sub-Saharan 
Africans and North Africans can be a source of instability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. 
The interaction between EIM and the process of externalisation represents a conundrum for 
scholars and policy makers alike. Although the effects of externalisation have been observed 
for some time, it can be argued that environmental change will bring a new dimension to the 
process. Failure of EU bodies to formulate policies specifically targeting EIMs currently seems 
to be the most important problem facing the EU. In the wake of a new political structure arising 
in the southern  Mediterranean, the EU policy makers can also consider how to manage 
different types of migration flows, rather than offloading them at any cost. 
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